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ü Summary
Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The
current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually
quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of
the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy
got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses
reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences.
 
Introduction
The selection of a winner in a national election depends not only upon the person’s qualities but also upon the voting
method. In the 2007 French presidential elections Sarkozy was selected by the current voting method but it should not
come as a surprise that under another system Bayrou would have won. What might come as a surprise however is that
the current system is not really democratic and that there is a democratic system that would have favoured Bayrou.
The current French system is called run-off plurality. The two candidates with the most votes of the first round go on to
the second round. The run-off plurality scheme has the property of destroying voter preferences, and a ruthless cut-off is
used to achieve the simplicity of a final binary choice. An alternative is the Borda Fixed Point method. That method (i)
uses all preferences, (ii) allows for some intensity of preference indicated by rank order, (iii) includes the condition that
the winner should also win from its main contender, (iv) finds this main contender under the counterfactual that the
winner would not partake. By the current system, Sarkozy got elected. By the Borda Fixed Point method Bayrou would
have been elected. 
What is relevant for the present discussion are not the candidates and their qualities but the properties of these methods.
Run-off plurality is less democratic than Borda Fixed Point. In fact, the system used in France is quite undemocratic
since the voters get a president that they would not prefer under optimal voting conditions.
It helps to see the wider picture. What would be a proper democratic system ? Given the widely differing opinions of
voters and the long lists of candidates, it is generally advisable to use indirect representative democracy. In parliamen-
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tary elections, parties advocate their preferences, the popular vote determines party sizes, whereupon the elected party
professionals can arrive at the final choice of the executive by using both bargaining and more complex voting schemes.
In this manner the information overload is reduced, both for voters who don’t have to think about long lists of candi-
dates  and for  voting mechanisms that  don’t have to calculate with millions of different preferences.  Representative
democracy also allows for bargaining that allows for optimal compromises.
This paper develops a voting example using the 2007 presidential elections in France. It is an example only, and the
discussion below will emphasize the limitations of the example. For a general discussion, see Colignatus (2007).  The
following will discuss the data, use the voting routines of “The Economics Pack”, run the two voting systems mentioned
above, and will close with a conclusion that should not come as a surprise.
This paper does not discuss historical issues. They may be briefly indicated for perspective. For historical reasons, some
countries  still  use direct  presidential  elections.  Their  methods of selection create  all  kinds of voting paradoxes  and
frequently lead to choices that do not properly reflect national sentiment. The main voting paradox is that the “popular
vote” is said to serve the interests of the voters while instead that direct method goes against the voters’ interest. Histori-
cally, the current suboptimal situation in national elections can best be explained by a serious deficiency by voting
theorists.  The  explanation  is  stated  in  Colignatus (2007)  and  can  be  briefly summarized as  follows. Starting with
Kenneth Arrow in 1951 voting theorists have emphasized impossibilities and paradoxes in voting instead of designing
systems that  would work. This  has  resulted  into  a  literature  that  is  pervasive in its  cynicism and anti-democractic
inclination. Some authors even advise dictatorship. In a massive “betrayal by the clerks”, voting theorists at the aca-
demia have entrenched points of view and are not open to the idea of optimal voting methods. As a result, democracy
suffers greatly, not only in national elections but also in, say, union elections or company board elections. It helps to
have examples that show avenues for improvement.
The data
For voting we need items (candidates), voter preferences, and voter weights.
The following data on France have been retrieved from Wikipedia (2007). This internet encyclopedia can be unstable,
both over long periods of time (a shift of interest) and even at freak moments (a hacker), but the retrieved data fit some
other reports in the media. The following table summarizes the data in a useful format.
The voting items are in the rows and the voting rounds are in the columns. The main contenders are Sarkozy and Royal,
who move on to the second round. The third column gives an estimate how the Bayrou vote of the first round was split
over Sarkozy and Royal in the second round,  with a remainder of either blank or  spoilt  vote (“Zero2”).  This table
expresses an assumption that all votes for Le Pen in the first round went to Sarkozy in the second round, so that some
3.7 million from Bayrou’s first round helped Sarkozy in the second round. The table also expresses the assumption that
all votes of the smaller leftist groups in the first round went to Royal in the second round, so that some 2.6 million of
Bayrou’s first round helped Royal in the second round. The number of voters in the 2nd round was also a bit larger, with
the difference indicated in the row “New”.
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DataTable
Round1 Round2 Bayrou2nd
Sarkozy 11448663 18983408 -
LePen 3834530 - -
Sarkozy2 - - 3700215
Royal 9500112 16790611 -
Leftist 4695327 - -
Royal2 - - 2595172
Bayrou 6820119 - -
Other 420645 - -
Valid 36719396 35774019 -
Zero 534846 1569450 -
Zero2 - - 524732
New - - 89227
Total 37254242 37343469 -
The lower rows give blank or spoilt votes and people abstaining in the first round and joining up in the second round.
The available data only give a net number and it may be that even more people joined while compensating for others
dropping out. Overall turnout was about 84% so potentially there can be quite some flows here. The sizable increase in
blank and spoilt votes in the second round is a bit curious since the whole system is intended such that there are only
two options available in that second round and thus it makes little sense to try to insert a third option - though people
apparently did.
Assumptions on preferences
Above assumptions already show that we lack proper data on the preferences. The available data are at the aggregate
level, give us only a first and second choice for the total. At the micro level anything might be possible. This means that
the discussion here is only indicative. But the example remains sufficiently clear for our stated purpose, to show that the
current French voting system is inoptimal (even though it is better than the US system). Any example suffices, also a
fabricated  one.  For  the  2007  French presidential  elections  we can  make some reasonable  assumptions so  that  the
example becomes a bit more realistic.
The following assumptions namely seem reasonable approximations. In this section we express the preferences by lists
of names of decreasing preference. (Eventually the voting routines use lists with increasing preferences.)
(1) For voters on Sarkozy in the first round, perhaps a large share would vote for LePen as second choice. How many, is
unknown. It is not so meaningful to use Le Pen’s score against Chirac some years ago, since that was another candidate,
and some years ago. We can insert an arbitrary split, say with 2 million voters. The majority of Sarkozy’s voters would
put Le Pen at the bottom of the list.
x = 2000000;
sA = 811448663 − x,
8Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<<;
sB = 8x, 8Sarkozy, LePen, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<<;
(2) The voters for Le Pen would prefer Sarkozy in the second round and Bayrou above others.
l = 83834530, 8LePen, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<<;
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(3) The Royal backing might have some subgroups who put Sarkozy or even LePen in second place. We neglect the
possibility of such subgroups however, selecting only one single preference, that puts Bayrou in third place.
r = 89500112, 8Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<<;
(4) The extreme left might rather abstain than vote for Royal or Bayrou. But overall it seems reasonable that we assign
Royal to the second position and Bayrou to the third.
left =
84695327, 8Leftist, Royal, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<<;
(5) The Bayrou vote is the one that we need to split.
bA = {3700215, {Bayrou, Sarkozy, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, 
Leftist}};
bB = {2595172, {Bayrou, Royal, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen, 
Leftist}};
bC = {524732, {Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, Royal, Other, LePen, 
Leftist}};
(6) For the other vote on the right we can assume the most interesting case that their second vote is for Sarkozy.
o = 8420645, 8Other, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, LePen, Royal, Leftist<<;
(7) The zero (blank or spoilt) vote of the first round is marginal and gets an arbitray allocation. But they are not moti-
vated to vote for the main contenders, so those drop to the lowest positions.
z = 8534846, 8Zero, Abstain, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<<;
(8) The people who abstained in the first round but joined in the second round are a curious lot. There can all kinds of
psychological considerations here, but the simplest one is that their second vote is a protest,  where they move from
abstinention to zero. Note though that this is a net number, so the true process might be more complex.
a = 889227, 8Abstain, Zero, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<<;
In summary, we have these assumptions on the preferences, reading a high value on the left and a low value on the right.
PrefData = 8sA, sB, l, r, left, bA, bB, bC, o, z, a<
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
9448663 8Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<
2000000 8Sarkozy, LePen, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<
3834530 8LePen, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<
9500112 8Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<
4695327 8Leftist, Royal, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<
3700215 8Bayrou, Sarkozy, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<
2595172 8Bayrou, Royal, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen, Leftist<
524732 8Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, Royal, Other, LePen, Leftist<
420645 8Other, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, LePen, Royal, Leftist<
534846 8Zero, Abstain, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<
89227 8Abstain, Zero, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
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Setting up the voting problem
We already mentioned the items:
Items = 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<;
We select the votes from the PrefData and check that their total is indeed the total of the second round.
Votes = First ê@ PrefData
89448663, 2000000, 3834530, 9500112, 4695327, 3700215, 2595172, 524732, 420645, 534846, 89227<
% êê Add
37343469
For the voting routines we assign scores 1 to 8 to the candidates, giving the highest value to the candidate of the highest
preference. The order  of the Items determines where a score is put. For example, the voters for Sarkozy will assign
value 8 to the first position, Sarkozy, 7 to their second choice Bayrou in the 5th position, and so on.
prefs = PrefToList ê@ HPref @@ # &L ê@ Reverse ê@ Last ê@ PrefData
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
8 2 3 1 7 6 5 4
8 7 2 1 6 5 4 3
7 8 2 1 6 5 4 3
2 1 8 7 6 5 4 3
2 1 7 8 6 5 4 3
7 2 3 1 8 6 5 4
3 2 7 1 8 6 5 4
5 2 4 1 8 3 7 6
7 3 2 1 6 8 5 4
1 3 2 5 4 6 8 7
1 3 2 5 4 6 7 8
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
This gives all elements to set up the voting problem. The votes will be expressed as ratio’s summing to 1.
SetVotingProblem@Votes, Items, prefsD
:Number of Voters Ø 11, Number of itemsØ 8, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1 Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal,
Preferences give a proper ordering Ø True, Preferences add up to Ø 836<,
ItemsØ 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<, Votes Ø : 9448663ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
2000000
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3834530
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3166704
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1565109
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1233405
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
2595172
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
524732
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
140215
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
178282
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
89227
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
>>
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The run-off plurality routine
To properly model run-off plurality we would have to account for shifts in preferences and participation between the
rounds. The candidates would keep the same name but they might shift their political positions. The following routine
however is simple, assumes that the numbers and preferences are exactly the same for the first and second round, and it
does not account for abstination and zero votes other than including them in the items. By consequence we get slightly
different numbers than the official figures. De denominators include not just the “valid” votes but also the zero and new
ones. The 1.6 million “zero” votes of the second round are allocated to either Sarkozy or Royal, so that in this simula-
tion run both get slightly more votes. (PM. To get the same result in the second round as in the official figures we might
substract the 1.6 million zero votes from both rounds, and distribute this proportionally. It is needlessly complicated to
do this just for this example.)
RunOffPlurality@D êê N
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 2
:First Ø
:Sum Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
Abstain 0.00238936
Bayrou 0.182632
Leftist 0.125734
LePen 0.102683
Other 0.0112642
Royal 0.254398
Sarkozy 0.306577
Zero 0.0143223
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0.00238936 Abstain
0.0112642 Other
0.0143223 Zero
0.102683 LePen
0.125734 Leftist
0.182632 Bayrou
0.254398 Royal
0.306577 Sarkozy
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.306577<, Select Ø 8<>,
Sum Ø
i
k
jjRoyal 0.466338
Sarkozy 0.533662
y
{
zz, Ordering Ø ik
jj 0.466338 Royal
0.533662 Sarkozy
y
{
zz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.533662<, Select Ø Sarkozy>
The Borda Fixed Point routine
Using the Borda Fixed Point routine, Bayrou is selected.
BordaFP@D
Bayrou
It appears that Bayrou would already have been selected by the Borda method itself but his position is also stable in the
sense that adding or removing a candidate would not quickly change his winning status.
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BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:Select Ø Bayrou, BordaFPQ Ø 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 84.99957, 2.53173, 4.88274, 3.47337, 6.58486, 5.444, 4.53948, 3.54426<,
Position Ø H 5. L, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
2.53173 LePen
3.47337 Leftist
3.54426 Abstain
4.53948 Zero
4.88274 Royal
4.99957 Sarkozy
5.444 Other
6.58486 Bayrou
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
>
In this case we have lumped together all  “other” candidates  into one person,  “who” comes as a surprising second.
Perhaps our results have been overly influenced by this ? The following section shows that this is not the case.
Reducing the number of candidates
From the list of preferences we can also select just the three main contenders. In that case the preferences range from 1
to 3 instead of 1 to 8. The main conclusion does not change. The run-off plurality scheme selects Sarkozy while Borda
FP selects Bayrou.
ReduceVotingProblem@8Sarkozy, Royal, Bayrou<D
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 8
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 3
:Number of Voters Ø 11, Number of itemsØ 3, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1 Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal,
Preferences give a proper ordering Ø True, Preferences add up to Ø 86<,
ItemsØ 8Sarkozy, Royal, Bayrou<, Votes Ø : 9448663ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
2000000
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3834530
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3166704
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1565109
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1233405
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
2595172
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
524732
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
140215
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
178282
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
89227
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
>>
Preferences
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
3 1 2
3 1 2
3 1 2
1 3 2
1 3 2
2 1 3
1 2 3
2 1 3
3 1 2
1 2 3
1 2 3
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
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RunOffPlurality@D êê N
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 2
:First Ø :Sum Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
Bayrou 0.199344
Royal 0.380132
Sarkozy 0.420524
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
0.199344 Bayrou
0.380132 Royal
0.420524 Sarkozy
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.420524<, Select Ø 8<>,
Sum Ø
i
k
jjRoyal 0.466338
Sarkozy 0.533662
y
{
zz, Ordering Ø ik
jj 0.466338 Royal
0.533662 Sarkozy
y
{
zz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.533662<, Select Ø Sarkozy>
BordaFP@D
Bayrou
BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:Select Ø Bayrou, BordaFPQ Ø 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 81.95419, 1.84647, 2.19934<, Position Ø H 3. L, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
1.84647 Royal
1.95419 Sarkozy
2.19934 Bayrou
y
{
zzzzzzzz>
Strategy
If Bayrou had made it  to  the second round then he would have beaten Sarkozy. One can imagine different voting
strategies coming into play. Royal could have known this already and withdrawn from the race.  Vanity gave her a
president who may be opposite to her ideals. But perhaps if she had dropped from the race, voters would have started
regarding Bayrou as a socialist candidate, so that he might have lost his overall appeal. So, Royal’s supporters might
have been wiser than she is and voted for Bayrou already in the first round. Perhaps many Sarkozy voters voted for
Royal to make sure that she got more votes than Bayrou.
Whatever all that may be, given above preferences, Bayrou would beat Sarkozy, which is one reason why he is a Borda
Fixed Point winner. The Borda Fixed Point method is not immune to strategic voting but less sensitive than current
systems.
WinnerOfPair@Sarkozy, BayrouD
Bayrou
Conclusion
Above discussion has taken aggregate data from the 2007 French presidential elections, added some arbitrary though
not unreasonable assumptions on the underlying preferences, and showed that the winner depends, once the preferences
are given, upon the voting method. The situation can be judged on the properties of these methods. 
Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The
current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually
quite undemocratic.
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The main conclusion is  for students of voting theory, and in particular for those without vested interests in current
theoretical  errors.  Voting theory both in the academic journals  and in public  statements needs to be realigned with
Colignatus (2007) otherwise democratic nations get wrong advice.
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